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Intrinsic motivation refers to people’s spontaneous tendencies to be curious and
interested, to seek out challenges and to exercise and develop their skills and
knowledge, even in the absence of operationally separable rewards. Over the past four
decades, experimental and field research guided by self-determination theory (SDT;
Ryan and Deci, 2017) has found intrinsic motivation to predict enhanced learning,
performance, creativity, optimal development and psychological wellness. Only recently,
however, have studies begun to examine the neurobiological substrates of intrinsic
motivation. In the present article, we trace the history of intrinsic motivation research,
compare and contrast intrinsic motivation to closely related topics (flow, curiosity,
trait plasticity), link intrinsic motivation to key findings in the comparative affective
neurosciences, and review burgeoning neuroscience research on intrinsic motivation.
We review converging evidence suggesting that intrinsically motivated exploratory
and mastery behaviors are phylogenetically ancient tendencies that are subserved by
dopaminergic systems. Studies also suggest that intrinsic motivation is associated with
patterns of activity across large-scale neural networks, namely, those that support
salience detection, attentional control and self-referential cognition. We suggest novel
research directions and offer recommendations for the application of neuroscience
methods in the study of intrinsic motivation.
Keywords: curiosity, dopamine, flow, intrinsic motivation, PLAY system, salience network, SEEKING system,
self-determination theory
Intrinsic motivation refers to the spontaneous tendency ‘‘to seek out novelty and challenges,
to extend and exercise one’s capacity, to explore, and to learn’’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p.70).
When intrinsically motivated, people engage in an activity because they find it interesting and
inherently satisfying. By contrast, when extrinsically motivated, people engage in an activity
to obtain some instrumentally separable consequence, such as the attainment of a reward, the
avoidance of a punishment, or the achievement of some valued outcome. Early evidence for the
distinction between these types of motivation came from experimental studies demonstrating
that tangible rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971). That is, contrary to the
ideas that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are additive or synergistically positive (e.g., Atkinson,
1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968), studies show that people experience less interest and exhibit less
spontaneous engagement with activities for which they were initially intrinsically motivated after
receiving tangible rewards for performing the activities (Deci et al., 1999).
Self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan and Deci, 2000, 2017) has emerged as the principle
framework for the study of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is frequently assessed
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behaviorally in terms of freely pursued activities, and
experientially through self-report questionnaires that probe the
reasons for one’s engagement with activities, as well as specific
affective states such as interest, curiosity and fun. Intrinsic
motivation has also been assessed in the laboratory through
the coding of specific exploratory and manipulatory behaviors
and facial displays of interested engagement (Reeve and Nix,
1997). Since the earliest demonstrations of the undermining
effect, many experimental and field studies have found
intrinsic motivation to be associated with enhanced learning,
performance, creativity, and affective experience. Further, a large
body of research within SDT has examined the situational factors
(e.g., types of rewards, feedback, communication styles) that
undermine or facilitate the expression of intrinsic motivation
(Ryan and Deci, 2017). These studies have made it clear that
although intrinsic motivation is a lifelong psychological growth
function, by no means is its expression automatic; rather,
intrinsic motivation depends on ambient supports for basic
psychological needs, especially those for competence (feeling
effective) and autonomy (feeling volitional).
Despite being a longstanding topic within the field of
motivation, only recently have researchers begun to use
neuroscience methods to examine intrinsic motivational
processes (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016). The use of
neuroscience methods is an important new frontier for intrinsic
motivation research for at least three interrelated reasons. First,
to state the obvious, experience and behavior are mediated by the
brain and a complete account of intrinsic motivation therefore
requires an understanding of the neural systems that support
it. Second, neuroscience affords the examination of internal
processes that are not accessible by self-reports of experience or
behavioral observations. A neuroscience of intrinsic motivation
therefore promises new insights that introspective and behavioral
methods alone cannot afford. Finally, neuroscience methods
can be used to investigate motivational processes at a higher
level of resolution than experiential and behavioral methods.
Neuroscience methods therefore have the potential to refine
conceptual accounts of intrinsic motivation by articulating the
granular processes that comprise it. In a relevant discussion,
Ochsner (2007; p.51) stated that, ‘‘The combination of multiple
streams of data allows researchers to converge on theoretical
explanations that are robust and flexible and are not tied to a
single specific experimental methodology’’. Intrinsic motivation
would seem to be an especially ripe topic for neuroscience
precisely because of the large body of empirical data that has
already been garnered at the experiential and behavioral levels of
analysis.
Our purpose of this review article is to survey the
progress of neuroscience research on intrinsic motivation.
Because intrinsic motivation is not a uniquely human capacity
(Harlow, 1953; Wilson, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2017) we
review conceptual developments in the comparative affective
neurosciences (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Biven, 2012) that
inform the concept of intrinsic motivation. Such considerations
are essential for appreciating intrinsic motivation as a basic
organismic capacity and for helping to clarify its unique
components in humans (Ryan andDi Domenico, 2016). Building
upon these insights, we map the phenomenology of intrinsic
motivation onto the neural substrates of motivational processes
that are encompassed by intrinsic motivation. Against the
backdrop of these preliminary ideas, we then review recent
studies that have examined the neural correlates of intrinsic
motivation. To anticipate our main conclusions, affective
neuroscience suggests that human intrinsic motivation is based
in ancient mammalian systems that govern exploration and
play. Neuroimaging studies, which have up to now focused
on curiosity and mastery tendencies, indicate that intrinsically
motivated states are subserved by neural regions that are
central to dopamine systems. These studies also hint at the
possible role of dynamic switching between large-scale brain
networks involved in salience detection, attentional control and
self-referential cognition. On the basis of these ideas, we suggest
novel research directions and offer recommendations for the
application of neuroscience methods in the study of intrinsic
motivation.
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION: AN ORGANISMIC
GROWTH PROCESS
Long before Deci’s (1971) experiments concerning intrinsic
motivation in humans and its undermining by rewards, Harlow
(1950) documented this effect in rhesus monkeys. He coined the
term intrinsic motivation to describe his observation that these
primates would persist in playing with mechanical puzzles even
in the absence of external rewards. Indeed, he observed that
the introduction of rewards for playing led these primates to
decrease their spontaneous manipulative explorations, relative
to those not exposed to external rewards. These and related
observations of spontaneous exploratory and play behaviors
defied some behaviorist views that intentional behaviors are
invariably controlled by reinforcement contingencies within the
environment (e.g., Skinner, 1953).
Early work with both primates and rats also exposed
some limitations of empirical drive theory (Hull, 1943), which
asserted that motivated behaviors aim to reduce internal drives
that stem from physiological need deficits. Because intrinsic
motivation often ensues in the absence and, on occasion,
independent of such deprivations, it was poorly explained
by traditional drive reduction accounts (White, 1959). Early
attempts to amend drive theory led researchers to postulate
the existence of various exploratory drives as the basis for
seemingly spontaneous curiosity, exploratory and manipulatory
behaviors (e.g., Butler, 1953; Harlow, 1953; Montgomery, 1954;
Myers and Miller, 1954). Apart from its lack of parsimony,
this ‘‘drive-naming’’ approach could not be reconciled with
the observations that exploratory activities do not resemble
consummatory responses and that animals often behave to
increase rather than decrease such exploratory drives (White,
1959; Deci and Ryan, 1985). As we shall see, these points are
respectively echoed in the contemporary research on the role
of dopamine in motivation, particularly by Berridge (2007)
distinction between incentive ‘‘wanting’’ and consummatory
‘‘liking’’ and by Panksepp’s (1998) work on the mammalian
SEEKING system.
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Variants of psychodynamic drive theory (Freud, 1927/1960)
proved similarly inadequate. For example, Fenichel (1945)
proposed that exploratory and mastery behaviors are driven
by the desire to reduce anxiety in the face of novel stimuli.
A revision of this hypothesis may be approximated from
the perspective of Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) septo-
hippocampal theory of anxiety. An extensive program of
research has established that novel stimuli—on an a priori
basis—represent potential sources of both punishment and
reward, elicit tendencies for both avoidance and approach, and
therefore often arouse anxious uncertainty and prompt cautious
investigatory behaviors. The investigatory behaviors instigated
by the septo-hippocampal system include risk assessment and
scanning the environment and one’s memory to resolve the
motivational conflict, that is, to compute whether approach or
avoidance should predominate.
Intrinsically motivated curiosity, exploration and mastery
behaviors, however, pertain to specific types of novel stimuli,
namely, those that present optimal challenges or optimal
inconsistencies with one’s extant knowledge and that accordingly
energize tendencies to approach (White, 1959; Csikszentmihalyi,
1990; Loewenstein, 1994; Ryan and Deci, 2017). Consistent
with the work of Gray and McNaughton (2000) intrinsic
motivation researchers have long noted that whereas too
much novelty relative to a person’s skill and knowledge
produces anxiety, too little novelty produces to boredom. During
intrinsic motivation, feelings of interest and positive excitement
predominate over both anxiety and boredom. Indeed, such
exploratory states entail searching for novelties and challenges
and, moreover, acting on the world to elicit novelties and
to discover new problems (Harlow, 1953; White, 1959; Deci
and Ryan, 1985). These observations indicate that intrinsically
motivated exploratory and mastery behaviors are primarily
energized by interest and appetitive mastery tendencies, not
anxiety reduction.
Given the shortcomings of operant behaviorism and drive
theory in regards to intrinsic motivation, White (1959) proposed
effectance motivation as a general behavioral and developmental
propensity of many organisms. Seemingly prescient of later
developments in the affective neurosciences (e.g., Panksepp,
1998; Panksepp and Biven, 2012), White (1959) argued that
effectance motivation is inherent to the activity of the central
nervous system and described it as ‘‘what the neuromuscular
system wants to do when it is otherwise unoccupied (e.g.,
by strong homeostatic drives) or is gently stimulated by
the environment’’ (p.321). According to White (1959), the
satisfactions associated with the effectance motive are not tied to
consummatory activities, but are instead intrinsic to the arousal
and maintenance of the activities that stem from it. Along similar
lines, DeCharms (1968) proposed that intrinsic motivation is
based in people’s ‘‘primary propensity’’ to experience themselves
as causal agents, that is, to experience their own actions as
having an internal perceived locus of causality. DeCharms’s
(1968) insightful theorizing helped set the stage for the earliest
experiments on the undermining effect as it suggested that
external enticements and pressures that detract one from
experiencing oneself as the center of initiation of their own
behaviors—that undermine autonomy—can diminish intrinsic
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985).
By the mid-1980s, numerous studies had examined the effects
of various situational factors on the expression of intrinsic
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985). This research indicated
that events like the provision of positive feedback (e.g., Fisher,
1978; Boggiano and Ruble, 1979; Ryan, 1982) and choice
(e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1978) enhanced intrinsic motivation and
that negative feedback (e.g., Deci and Cascio, 1972; Vallerand
and Reid, 1984), deadlines (e.g., Amabile et al., 1976), and
other external impositions (e.g., surveillance; Lepper and Greene,
1975) generally diminished intrinsic motivation. To account
for the diversity of findings from these and other studies,
Deci and Ryan (1985), drawing on the ideas of White (1959)
and DeCharms (1968), proposed that intrinsic motivation is a
lifelong psychological growth function that is based in the basic
psychological needs for competence and autonomy. Competence
refers to feelings of effectance, the sense of growing mastery in
activities that are optimally challenging and that further develop
one’s capacities. Autonomy refers to an experience of volition
and integrity, the sense that one’s behavior is authentic and
self-organized rather than internally conflicted and pressured
or externally coerced. Within SDT, competence and autonomy
are seen as essential elements in people’s active propensities
to seek out challenges, to be curious and interested, and to
develop and express their capacities: when these needs are
supported, intrinsic motivation may ensue; when these needs are
thwarted, intrinsic motivation is undermined (Ryan and Deci,
2017).
In terms of both evolution and development, intrinsic
motivation confers many adaptive consequences for organisms
(Ryan andDeci, 2017). For example, intrinsic motivation exposes
organisms to novel situations and therefore occasions the
development of diverse skills and competencies to cope with
uncertain future situations. Intrinsic motivations are particularly
important for those species that have a protracted period of
postnatal development and occupy complex habitats (Wilson,
2000). In this vein, Deci and Ryan (2000, p.252) pointed out
that:
If people did not experience satisfaction from learning for its
own sake (but instead needed to be prompted by external
reinforcements) they would be less likely to engage the domain-
specific skills and capacities they inherited, to develop new
potentialities for adaptive employment, or both . . . for instance,
by aiding in the discovery of alternative food sources, mapping
the complexities of game migrations, or taking interest in skills,
rituals, and social rules transmitted by other group members.
Extending this evolutionary thinking, Ryan and Hawley (2016)
reviewed empirical evidence that competence and autonomy
satisfactions supply proximal supports for intrinsically motivated
activities even when the adaptive consequences of such activities
are not the phenomenal aims of the individuals enacting
them.
At the level of personality functioning, intrinsic motivation
provides the impetus for individuals to learn about particular
subject areas and to differentiate their interests, fostering the
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development of personal identities that confer a sense of
authenticity, meaning, and purpose (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan
and Deci, 2012). For example, meta-analyses and field studies
point to intrinsic motivation as perhaps the most important
form of motivation in school achievement (e.g., Taylor et al.,
2014; Froiland and Worrell, 2016). In a related vein, Peterson
(1999) argued that the dedicated and courageous pursuit of one’s
interests optimizes personality development by incrementally
exposing one to new ideas and challenges, thereby preventing
ideological rigidity and fostering learning, growth, and meaning
in life. Indeed, various scholars have proposed that intrinsically
motivated self-examination plays a key role in the development
of the highest human virtues, including wisdom (e.g., Habermas,
1972; Csikszentmihalyi and Rathmunde, 1990; Vervaeke and
Ferraro, 2013).
Neuroethological Perspectives on
Mammalian Exploration: A Starting Point
for Conceptualizing Intrinsic Motivation in
the Brain
We previously pointed out (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016) that
the concept of intrinsically motivated exploration is consistent
with the ‘‘affective neuroethological’’ perspective of Panksepp
and colleagues (Panksepp, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999;
Alcaro et al., 2007; Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011; Panksepp and
Biven, 2012). These researchers have argued that mammals
are hardwired with a general-purpose SEEKING system that
energizes many types of foraging and exploratory activities.
Although the SEEKING system does service homeostatic
imbalances and is responsible for energizing learned appetitive
behaviors, it continuously operates to keep animals in a
state of exploratory engagement with their environments.
That is, the SEEKING system is believed to function as an
objectless appetitive system—a ‘‘goad without a goal’’—until the
exploratory disposition it produces leads to the discovery and
learning of useful regularities.
The SEEKING system is a spontaneous, unconditioned behavior
generator that takes animals to places, actively and inquisitively,
where associated learning mechanisms allow them to develop
knowledge structures, to guide their foremost evolutionary action
tools (inbuilt emotional systems) to createmore structures—more
higher mental processes—which facilitate survival (Panksepp and
Biven, 2012, p.135).
It is worth pointing out that even within radical behaviorism
this inherent activity of organisms could not be fully ignored,
though it was marginalized by Skinner’s concept of ‘‘the
operant’’. Skinner acknowledged that organisms do ‘‘operate’’
on their environments, but regarded such exploratory activities
as random behaviors that come under the control of external
reinforcement.
The core structures that comprise the SEEKING system in the
rat are the ventral tegmental area (VTA), the nucleus accumbens
(NAcc), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and
the dopaminergic projections originating from the VTA that
innervate these areas (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Biven,
2012). These regions are frequently called the ‘‘brain reward
network’’ because, as Olds and Milner (1954) discovered, rats
will learn to instrumentally obtain electrical stimulations in this
area. However, the invigorated searching and sniffing following
such electrical stimulations look like states of invigorated
curious exploration rather than states of calm satiation (see
White, 1959): ‘‘The most dramatic observation. . .is that animals
getting this kind of brain stimulation frantically explore their
environments, taking notice of all the new stimuli they
encounter’’ (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p.126). These basic
SEEKING urges are elaborated into more complex forms
of exploration in behaviorally and cognitively sophisticated
animals: our dexterity affords the manipulation and exploration
of complex objects and our cognitive faculties afford interest
in ideas, abstract objects and possibilities that we can explore
and manipulate with our minds. The SEEKING system is thus
believed to energize ‘‘many mental complexities that humans
experience as persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation
seeking and, in the presence of a sufficiently complex cortex, the
search for higher meaning’’ (Panksepp, 1998, p.145).
The first experimental studies on intrinsic motivation were
conducted on nonhuman animals (Harlow, 1950) and it is
therefore fitting that the first insights on the neurobiology
of intrinsic motivation have been derived in animal research.
Although generalizations based on animal research must
be made with caution, affective neuroscience suggests that
human intrinsic motivation is an elaboration of ancient
mammalian motivations for exploratory SEEKING. The affective
neuroethological point of view from which this system is
conceptualized dovetails the organismic perspective from which
SDT developed (Ryan and Deci, 2017). It is remarkable and
telling that independent lines of research stemming from such
methodologically diverse traditions should converge on similar
points of view.
RELATED PERSPECTIVES ON INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION
Aspects of intrinsic motivation have also been examined from
perspectives other than SDT. Because some of the empirical
studies that we review in upcoming sections are based on these
related topics, we briefly summarize these perspectives here to
note similarities and differences with SDT.We also briefly review
topics that bear important conceptual relations to intrinsic
motivation and note the utility of these for helping to inform the
emerging neuroscience of intrinsic motivation.
The close relation between SDT’s concept of intrinsic
motivation and Csikszentmihalyi (1990) concept of flow has
been noted for a long time (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000). Flow
refers to experiential states of total absorption, optimal challenge,
and non-self-conscious enjoyment of an activity. Like intrinsic
motivation, when people experience flow, the satisfactions they
experience are inherent to the activity itself and their behavior
is ‘‘autotelic’’ (auto = self, telos = goal) or performed for its own
sake. Like SDT, flow theory emphasizes the phenomenology of
intrinsic motivation. Flow theory is particularly articulate in its
description of the optimal challenges and ensuing competence
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satisfactions associated with intrinsic motivation. For example,
Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2014; p.90) describe the flow
state as the subjective experience of engaging ‘‘just-manageable
challenges by tackling a series of goals, continuously processing
feedback about progress, and adjusting action based on this
feedback’’. However, apart from recognizing the autotelic
(i.e., intrinsically motivating) aspects of flow activities, flow
theory does not formally recognize autonomy as an essential
component of flow (Deci and Ryan, 2000).
Loewenstein (1994) proposed an ‘‘information-gap’’
hypothesis of curiosity according to which curiosity arises
when people experience a discrepancy between what they
know and what they want to know. Although this knowledge
discrepancy is supposedly experienced as aversive, satisfying
curiosity is pleasurable and people therefore voluntarily seek to
elicit curiosity. There are some obvious links between SDT and
Loewenstein’s (1994) information-gap hypothesis of curiosity.
First, feelings of curiosity are regularly referenced in descriptions
of intrinsic motivation within SDT and Loewenstein (1994; p.87)
correspondingly described curiosity as ‘‘an intrinsically
motivated desire for specific information’’. Second, both
intrinsic motivation and curiosity seeking are processes that
describe types of self-directed learning. Finally, although
Lowenstein’s theory does not formally include the concept of
autonomy, his notion of what constitutes an ‘‘information-gap’’
is well-aligned with SDT’s notion of competence. Specifically,
one way to conceptualize information-gaps in knowledge is in
terms of optimal incongruities between one’s extant knowledge
structures and the unknown (Deci and Ryan, 1985). Intrinsically
motivated activities, activities that are energized by the need for
competence and that entail orienting toward novel stimuli and
optimal challenges, can thus be seen as a process of continually
seeking and reducing information-gaps in knowledge.
Perhaps the most notable divergence between SDT and
Loewenstein’s account concerns his description of curiosity as
a consummatory, drive-reduction process—i.e., the closure of
information gaps. A close variant of this discrepancy between
organismic and drive-theory accounts of intrinsicmotivationwas
resolved in the earliest critiques of the drive-naming approach
to intrinsically motivated exploration. Both White (1959) and
Deci and Ryan (1985) pointed out that while curiosity for
particular objects or places may satiate the tendency to explore
those particular objects or areas, the tendency to explore itself
is not satiated. Thus, SDT’s organismic account of intrinsic
motivation and Loewenstein’s (1994) drive-reduction account of
curiosity seeking can be reconciled by recognizing that curiosity
is a more delimited phenomenon subsumed by intrinsically
motivated exploration. Piaget (1971), in his organismic account
of cognitive development, expressed a similar view. He proposed
that cognitive-behavioral schemata possess inherent functions to
assimilate new information and to elaborate pre-existing skills,
inherent functions that can be productively described as being
intrinsically motivated (Ryan and Deci, 2017). Piaget (1971) thus
saw curiosity as a continual process that ‘‘goes through various
steps, in the sense that whenever one problem is solved, new
problems are opened up. These are new avenues for curiosity’’
(Evans, 1973, pp.68–69).
A concept related to intrinsic motivation has also emerged
within the ‘‘Five-Factor’’ or ‘‘Big Five’’ model of personality
research (John et al., 2008; McCrae and Costa, 2008). Specifically,
DeYoung (2010, 2013) has argued that the higher-order
trait plasticity (i.e., the shared variance of extraversion and
openness/intellect) represents stable interindividual differences
in people’s exploratory tendencies. Apart from the obvious
difference that intrinsic motivation refers to a motivational
state, whereas plasticity refers to dispositional trait, these two
phenomena have some notable features in common. Like
intrinsic motivation, plasticity entails being ‘‘actively engaged
with the possibilities of the environment, both generating and
attending to novel aspects of experience’’ (DeYoung, 2010, p.27,
and although plastic exploration has not been formally described
using the concept of autonomy, people high in plasticity are
hypothesized to ‘‘desire exploration for its own sake (i.e., they
treat it as a goal in itself) and engage in it even at times when
exploration will not obviously further their goals’’ (DeYoung,
2013, p.8). These conceptual links between plasticity and intrinsic
motivation are important because recent years have seen a
marked increase in the field’s understanding of the neurobiology
of plasticity, most specifically, its association with dopamine
(DeYoung, 2013). These insights inform some of the ideas in the
current presentation.
MAPPING PHENOMENOLOGY TO BRAIN
FUNCTION: TOWARD A
NEUROBIOLOGICAL MODEL OF HUMAN
OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
The biggest challenge facing researchers who wish to examine
the neural substrates of intrinsic motivation is the absence
of an overarching neurobiological framework with which to
derive and test specific hypotheses. Exploratory studies, though
potentially useful for advancing research in novel directions
when conducted with suitably large samples, typically afford
lower statistical power and are therefore prone to both Type
I errors (false positives) and Type II errors (false negatives).
This limitation of exploratory research is especially problematic
in neuroimaging studies that do not specify a priori regions
of interest and need to correct for multiple statistical tests
when comparing neural activity across multiple brain regions
(Allen and DeYoung, 2016). In the absence of a guiding theory,
it is also difficult to design experimental paradigms that are
optimally suited to examine specific components of intrinsic
motivation.
Recognizing that even a preliminary neurobiological account
of intrinsic motivation could facilitate theory-driven research
and provide a useful vantage point for aligning the disparate
empirical studies to date, we offer an initial iteration by
mapping the phenomenology of intrinsic motivation to the
neural substrates of motivational processes that are encompassed
by intrinsic motivation. We organize these ideas in the form
of summary propositions. Against the backdrop of these
propositions, we review studies that have examined the neural
correlates of intrinsic motivation.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 145
Di Domenico and Ryan Intrinsic Motivation Neuroscience
Proposition I: Intrinsic Motivation is
Supported by Dopaminergic Systems
Intrinsic motivation is a complex cognitive, affective, and
behavioral phenomenon that is likely mediated by multiple
neural structures and processes. For this reason, a useful point
of entry for elucidating the neurobiology of intrinsic motivation
is to consider the broad neurotransmitter systems that may
underlie it.
Three lines of evidence suggest that dopamine is a key
substrate of intrinsic motivation. First, as the review above
suggests, intrinsic motivation in humans is an elaboration of the
exploratory activities subserved by the mammalian SEEKING
system, and dopamine is central to the neurochemistry of this
system (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Biven, 2012). Second,
like intrinsic motivation, dopamine is associated with increased
positive affect, cognitive flexibility, creativity (Ashby et al.,
1999), behavioral persistence (Salamone and Correa, 2016), and
exploration in the face of novelty (DeYoung, 2013). Importantly,
the positively affective states associated with dopamine reflect
energized appetitive ‘‘wanting’’ not consummatory ‘‘liking’’, the
hedonic effects of which are mediated by opioids (Berridge,
2007; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2016). Third, there is some
evidence of a direct link between intrinsic motivation and
dopamine. Using positron emission tomography, de Manzano
et al. (2013) found that people who are disposed to experience
intrinsically motivated flow states in their daily activities have
greater dopamine D2-receptor availability in striatal regions,
particularly the putamen. This finding suggests that people’s
capacities for intrinsic motivation are associated with the number
of targets within the striatum for dopamine to act upon. More
recently, Gyurkovics et al. (2016) found that carriers of a genetic
polymorphism that affects striatal D2-receptor availability were
more prone to experience flow during study- and work-related
activities. Altogether, it would thus seem reasonable to forward
the initial working hypothesis that dopamine is a key substrate of
intrinsic motivation.
Dopamine neurons originate in the midbrain and have two
modes of activity, tonic and phasic (Grace, 1991). In the tonic
mode, the neurons exhibit a steady baseline rate of firing in
which dopamine is steadily released to target structures. This
tonic activity promotes the normal functioning of relevant
neural circuits (Schultz, 2007) and may reflect the general
strength of animals’ exploratory SEEKING tendencies (Alcaro
and Panksepp, 2011). In the phasic mode, dopamine neurons
exhibit short bursts of activity or inactivity (above or below their
baseline) in response to specific events, resulting in an increase or
decrease of dopamine in target structures lasting several seconds.
The phasic mode of dopamine transmission may ‘‘transiently
activate SEEKING patterns in coincidence with specific cue- or
context-dependent information, attributing to such information
an incentive motivational, action-orienting effect’’ (Alcaro and
Panksepp, 2011, p.1810). Of course, the tonic and phasic modes
of dopamine transmission likely interact in complex ways to
regulate intrinsic motivation. For example, Alcaro et al. (2007)
advanced the hypothesis that moderately high levels of tonic
dopamine optimize the SEEKING behavior promoted by phasic
dopamine release: when tonic levels of dopamine are too low,
phasic signals lack the efficacy to promote exploration; but when
tonic levels are too high, phasic signals lose their informational
value and exploratory behavior patterns are uncoupled from
relevant contextual stimuli. Given the nascent state of the field,
however, questions about how the tonic and phasic modes
of dopamine release interact to influence intrinsic motivation
remain outside the scope of the present effort. We instead focus
on making the less specific case for a general relation between
dopamine and intrinsic motivation.
Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010) recently proposed a model of
dopaminergic function that is based on the recognition of two
types of dopamine neurons that exhibit distinct types of phasic
activity: value-coding neurons and salience-coding neurons. We
review the properties of these neurons and their relevance to
intrinsic motivation below.
Value-coding neurons are phasically excited by unexpected
rewarding events and inhibited by unexpected aversive events;
events that are wholly expected elicit little or no response.
Value-coding dopamine neurons are found in the ventromedial
substantia nigra pars compacta (SN) and throughout the VTA.
From these midbrain regions, these neurons project axons that
innervate the NAcc shell, the dorsal striatum (caudate and
putamen), and the VMPFC, where they send signals about the
availability of rewards, evaluation of outcomes, and learning. The
phasic signals emitted by value-coding neurons are classically
recognized as ‘‘reward-prediction errors’’ within neobehaviorist
theories and are believed to be an important mechanism through
which animals learn about external reinforcement contingencies
(Schultz, 2007).
However, Tricomi and DePasque (2016) recently argued that,
even in the absence of external rewards, this dopaminergic
pathway registers the endogenous signals of positive and
negative feedback that are elicited during the performance
of many activities. The types of activities that people find
intrinsically motivating provide just-manageable challenges,
clear proximal goals, and immediate feedback (Nakamura and
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Ryan and Deci, 2017). For example:
As people work on crossword puzzles, they get feedback from the
task itself (i.e., the letters fit), and they are likely to feel a sense of
joy from making progress at puzzles that challenge them. . .No
external feedback is required, and, surely, the task-inherent
positive feedback is gratifying and helps sustain interest and
persistence (Ryan and Deci, 2017, p.154).
Another way of describing this optimally challenging nature of
intrinsically motivated activities is to say that the positive and
negative feedback that people receive during their performance
of such activities is not entirely unexpected—a performative
context that suggests phasic dopaminergic signaling. Following
Tricomi and DePasque (2016), we therefore propose that a
high rate of dopaminergic signaling within the value system
is inherent to the performance of intrinsically motivating
activities.
In addition to value-coding neurons, Bromberg-Martin et al.
(2010) identified salience-coding neurons. These dopamine
neurons are phasically excited by both unexpected rewarding and
punishing events. These neurons are found in the dorsolateral
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SN and medial VTA, and project to the NAcc core, the
dorsal striatum, and the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC). The regions
innervated by salience-coding neurons support the orienting of
attention, cognitive processing, and the invigoration of actions.
Dovetailing Loewenstein’s (1994) information-gap hypothesis
of curiosity, DeYoung (2013) proposed that salience-related
dopaminergic activity energizes exploration ‘‘in response to the
incentive value of the possibility of gaining information—that
is, it drives curiosity and the desire for information’’ (p.4).
Curiosity and interest are of course long recognized components
of intrinsic motivation. For example, the Intrinsic Motivation
Inventory (Ryan et al., 1983), a self-report measure of intrinsic
motivation for experimental settings that is used to predict free
choice behavioral persistence, includes items such as ‘‘I found
the task very interesting’’ and ‘‘I thought the task was very
boring (reverse scored)’’. These items describe the type of eager
attentiveness and behavioral engagement that may be associated
dopaminergic salience signaling. Thus, building on DeYoung
(2013), we propose that the salience-coding system also subserves
intrinsic motivation.
Apart from the aforementioned studies by de Manzano et al.
(2013) and Gyurkovics et al. (2016), empirical studies have
not directly examined the link between dopamine and intrinsic
motivation. However, if intrinsic motivation is associated
with dopaminergic transmission, then intrinsically motivated
activities should be associated with activation across core regions
of the dopaminergic systems identified by Bromberg-Martin et al.
(2010). In the paragraphs that follow, we focus on neuroimaging
findings relating intrinsic motivation to activity within regions
of the dopaminergic value system. Studies relating intrinsic
motivation to activity within regions of the dopaminergic
salience system are reviewed separately because such findings
are also consistent with the complementary proposition that
intrinsic motivation is associated with patterns of activity across
specific large-scale neural networks.
Murayama et al. (2010) examined the neural correlates of
the undermining effect using fMRI. University undergraduates
were asked to play a game-like stopwatch task in which they
were asked to press a button within 50 ms of the 5 s mark.
In a series of pilot tests, the authors determined that students
found this task challenging and interesting, and therefore suitable
for examining intrinsic motivation. Like classic studies on the
undermining effect (e.g., Deci, 1971), participants were divided
in two groups: a reward group that received performance-
contingent rewards for each successful trail and a control group
that received no payments. During an initial scanning session,
participants in both groups evidenced greater activity in the
midbrain and caudate upon the receipt of success feedback
relative to failure feedback. Subsequent to the experimental
manipulation, and consistent with previous behavioral studies
on the undermining effect, participants in the reward group
were less likely to voluntarily engage with the task during a
free-choice time period relative to those in the control group.
Importantly, this behavioral undermining of intrinsic motivation
was paralleled by reduced activity in the caudate and midbrain
during a second scanning session when monetary rewards were
no longer administered to the reward group. In contrast the
unrewarded group maintained its previous levels of activation.
This difference in activity between the control and experimental
groups is consistent with the idea that the dopaminergic value
system is responsive to cues that signal task-related progress
during intrinsically motivated activities.
In a more recent fMRI study, Murayama et al. (2015)
had participants perform an adapted version of the stopwatch
task (Murayama et al., 2010) in two conditions: an autonomy
condition in which they were free to choose the appearance of
the stopwatch according to their preferences and a forced-choice
condition in which they had to proceed with the stopwatch
selected by the computer. Results indicated that activity within
the VMPFC (bilateral gyrus rectus and medial orbitofrontal
gyrus) was greater upon the receipt of success feedback than
failure feedback. However, this effect was modulated by the
type of the trial conditions. On the one hand, the VMPFC
exhibited similarly high levels of activity across success and
failure feedback after free-choice (autonomy) trials. On the other
hand, this region exhibited marked reductions in activity after
forced-choice trials. Importantly, this sustained activity within
the VMPFC in response to failure feedback was associated
with enhanced performance within the free-choice condition.
Present evidence suggests that value coding dopamine neurons
in the midbrain project to the VMPFC and that this structure
is involved in learning from negative reward prediction errors
and updating outcome expectations during learning (Bromberg-
Martin et al., 2010). These results are thus consistent with the
idea that intrinsic motivation, and the perceived autonomy that
phenomenally supports it, is associated with activity within the
dopaminergic value system.
Conceptually related to these fMRI studies is research
examining intrinsic motivation using electroencephalography
(EEG). Two specific EEG waveforms that have been associated
with intrinsic motivation are the ‘‘error-related negativity’’
(ERN) and the ‘‘feedback-related negativity’’ (FRN). Both
of these waveforms are negative-going deflections in EEG
recordings that arise during speeded-response tasks. Whereas
the ERN appears within 100 ms following the commission of
errors, the FRN appears between 200 ms and 350 ms following
the receipt of negative feedback. Holroyd and Coles (2002)
proposed that both the ERN and FRN arise as a consequence
of phasic reductions in midbrain dopaminergic signaling to
ACC, the purported neural generator of these waveforms. These
phasic reductions in dopamine transmission to the ACC, and
the consequent ERN and FRN, are believed to constitute a
learning signal that tunes the ACC to optimize behavioral
performance, an account that parallels the reward-prediction
signaling of value-coding dopamine neurons (Schultz, 2007;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
In a sample of school children, Fisher et al. (2009) found
that intrinsic academic motivation was associated with larger
ERN amplitudes during a flanker task. In a study that paralleled
the design of Murayama et al. (2010), Ma et al. (2014) found
that participants who had received performance-contingent
monetary rewards while performing a challenging activity
evidenced reduced FRN amplitudes whereas those in a control
group evidenced consistently pronounced FRNs. In another
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study, this time paralleling the design of Meng and Ma (2015)
and Murayama et al. (2015) found that having the opportunity
to exercise choice during the performance of an intrinsically
motivating task was associated with larger FRN amplitudes. An
important caveat to these studies is their small sample sizes
(N = 17, 36 and 18, respectively), which raises uncertainty
about reliability of their reported effects. To this point, Jin et al.
(2015; N = 16) found lower FRN amplitudes when participants
received negative feedback on a supposedly interesting task
relative to a boring task. In light of these small sample
sizes and diversity of findings, it is clear that more decisive
larger-sample studies are required. Nevertheless, the available
evidence from these EEG studies is generally consistent with the
idea that intrinsic motivation is associated with dopaminergic
signaling.
Other evidence of a link between intrinsic motivation and the
dopaminergic system comes from studies examining the neural
correlates of curiosity. Kang et al. (2009; Study 1) used fMRI
to examine curiosity as it is framed by the information-gap
theory of Loewenstein (1994). We previously pointed out that
the information-gaps in people’s knowledge structures, and
the ensuing feelings of curiosity that such gaps elicit, can
be productively framed in terms of people’s orienting toward
optimal challenges. Participants reflected upon a series of trivia
questions (e.g., What instrument was invented to sound like a
human singing?) and rated their curiosity for each one. During
the presentation of the trivia questions, items that elicited greater
curiosity were associated with activations in the left caudate and
parahippocampal gyri (PHG). Furthermore, when trivia answers
were revealed following incorrect responses, participants’ level
of curiosity was associated with greater activity in the midbrain
and left PHG. Although Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010) did
not identify the PHG as a core component of the dopamine
system, Kang et al. (2009) point out that this region is involved
in successful memory encoding and its activity during states
of curiosity is therefore consistent with the idea that intrinsic
motivation is associated with enhanced learning.
A follow-up study by Gruber et al. (2014) more directly
assessed the relation between curiosity and learning. This
study used trivia questions similar to Kang et al. (2009) to
examine if states of curiosity improved memory for task-relevant
information and for information that was incidental to the
main task. Incidental information consisted of face stimuli that
were presented to participants when they anticipated trivia
answers. During the presentation of trivia questions, curiosity
was associated with activity in the left SN/VTA, bilateral
NAcc, and bilateral dorsal striatum. Furthermore, replicating
the behavioral results of Kang et al. (2009; Study 2), in both
immediate and delayed memory tests, participants recalled more
answers for high- relative to low-curiosity questions. Extending
these previous behavioral findings, Gruber et al. (2014) also
found enhanced recall of incidental face stimuli presented during
high-curiosity questions. These memory effects were associated
with greater activity in the SN/VTA and the hippocampus during
the presentation of trivia questions and increased functional
connectivity between these regions when participants anticipated
answers to the trivia questions.
Proposition II: Intrinsic Motivation Entails
Dynamic Switching between Brain
Networks for Salience Detection,
Attentional Control and Self-Referential
Cognition
A complementary approach to theorizing about the neural
systems that support intrinsic motivation is to map its
phenomenology with the activity of large-scale neural networks
(Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016). Research on structural and
functional brain organization has revealed multiple large-
scale brain networks that support various cognitive functions
(Bressler and Menon, 2010). Among these is the so-called
salience network, which is believed to support the detection of
subjectively important events and the mobilization of attentional
and working memory resources in the service of goal-directed
behavior (Menon and Uddin, 2010; Menon, 2015). The salience
network is anchored in the anterior insula (AI) and dorsal ACC
and includes major subcortical nodes in the amygdala, NAcc,
the SN, and VTA. These subcortical nodes are believed to send
signals about the motivational significance of stimuli to the AI;
the AI in turn is believed to integrate this information with
incoming sensory inputs from both the external environment
and the viscera for the bottom-up detection of contextually
important events. Through its reciprocal connections with the
dACC, a key structure for executive control, the AI is believed
to selectively amplify neural signals of important events for the
effective deployment of cognitive resources.
Little is presently known about the specific role of dopamine
in the functioning of the salience network. However, AI
does receive inputs from the amygdala, the likely source of
the motivational salience signals sent to dopamine neurons
in the midbrain, from the ventral striatum, which receives
dopaminergic projections from the midbrain, and from the
SN and the VTA, the midbrain regions from which dopamine
neurons originate (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Menon, 2015). Additionally, the AI has reciprocal
connections with the dACC, which likely receives direct
input from both value- and salience-coding dopamine neurons
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). These connections imply that the
AI may play a role in contextualizing the signals of motivational
significance transmitted by both value- and salience-coding
dopamine neurons. Most relevant in this regard is the suggestion
that the AI functions as a dynamic hub for modulating the
activity of two other large-scale brain networks (Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Menon, 2015). The first, known as the default
mode network, has major nodes in the MPFC and the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC). These regions show high levels of activity
during passive resting states (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001), tasks
involving internally-focused, self-referential cognition (Northoff
et al., 2006), and mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007). The
second, known as the central executive network, includes the
DLPFC and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC). The regions of
this network, which are important substrates of workingmemory
and executive functions, typically show elevated activity during
cognitively demanding, externally-focused tasks. Importantly,
activity across the default mode and central executive networks
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often fluctuates in an antagonistic manner, such that activity in
one is often accompanied by suppressed activity in the other.
The antagonistic dynamic between the default mode
and central executive networks, along with the role of
the salience-mediating switching instigated by the AI,
may inform three characteristics of intrinsic motivation.
First, in its most experientially abundant state, intrinsic
motivation entails cognitive absorption and non-self-conscious
enjoyment of an activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Nakamura
and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). This phenomenology suggests
diminished activity within regions of the default mode network,
which are commonly activated during self-focused mental
activity (e.g., self-reflection, rumination) and mind-wandering,
and heightened activity within the central executive network,
which is engaged during bouts of externally focused attention.
Second, intrinsic motivation is reliably associated with enhanced
performance, cognitive flexibility, and deeper conceptual
learning (e.g., Grolnick and Ryan, 1987). This relation between
intrinsicmotivation and enhanced task performance is consistent
with, and may be partly explained by, greater mobilization of
the central executive network during intrinsically motivating
tasks (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016). Third, classic perspectives
that describe autonomy or authenticity as a state of ‘‘organismic
congruence’’ (e.g., Rogers, 1961) characterize it as an embodied
cognitive process whereby sensory and visceral information is
permitted to access and direct one’s attention, in a bottom-up
manner, to events of subjective importance and meaning (also
see Peterson, 1999). The salience network, and the AI most
specifically, with its receipt of sensory and visceral input and
its interoceptive functions (Craig, 2009; Menon and Uddin,
2010; Menon, 2015), would seem well-suited to support this
aspect of autonomy, especially during intrinsic motivation when
people orient themselves to stimuli that spontaneously grip their
attention and interest.
Neuroimaging studies have reported patterns of neural
activity consistent with the idea that intrinsic motivation recruits
the salience and central executive networks, while suppressing
the default mode network. In the aforementioned study by
Murayama et al. (2010), the undermining of intrinsic motivation
was associated with decreases in lateral PFC activity in response
to task onset cues. The study by Murayama et al. (2015) found
increased activity within the midbrain, ACC, and bilateral insula
in response to free-choice (autonomy) cues relative to forced-
choice cues at the onset of task trials. The curiosity studies by
Kang et al. (2009) and Gruber et al. (2014) found greater activity
within the lateral PFC during curiosity-inducing questions. More
recently, Marsden et al. (2015) observed neural activations
within several structures that comprise the SN. Specifically,
their study found participants who spent more free-choice
time solving remote-associate word problems (i.e., a behavioral
marker of intrinsic motivation) showed greater activity in the
ACC, amygdala, anterior and posterior insula, PHG, and caudate
nucleus after trial onsets that immediately followed negative
feedback for preceding trials. Jepma et al. (2012) examined the
neural correlates of perceptual curiosity. Participants viewed
blurry images of otherwise easily recognizable objects that
induced feelings of curiosity, and were subsequently shown clear
images of the objects to satisfy their curiosity. Results indicated
that induction of curiosity was associated with significant
activations within the AI and ACC, the core regions of the
salience network, and significant deactivations within regions
associated with the default mode network. Additionally, this
study found that the resolution of perceptual curiosity was
associated with activity within the left caudate, putamen, and
NAcc, regions that comprise the core of the dopaminergic
system.
A set of studies (Lee et al., 2012; Lee and Reeve, 2013)
examined the neural correlates of intrinsic motivation by
comparing patterns of neural activity when undergraduate
students imagined themselves performing intrinsically
motivating activities (e.g., ‘‘writing an enjoyable article’’) and
extrinsically motivating activities (e.g., ‘‘writing an extra-credit
article’’). Most prominently, these studies found preferential
activity within insular regions when participants imagined the
enactment of intrinsically motivating activities. Building on this
initial work, Lee (2016) more recently described the results of
an fMRI study that examined functional connectivity between
striatal regions and the AI when participants attempted trivia
questions and anagrams. Results indicated that when participants
worked on intrinsically motivating problems (curiosity inducing-
questions and competence-enabling anagrams) they evidenced
greater activity and functional connectivity between these
regions.
Klasen et al. (2012) examined the neural correlates of flow
using fMRI recordings obtained during free play of a video
game. The authors developed an objective coding system for
examining different components of the flow experience based
on player-generated video game contents. Consistent with the
idea that intrinsic motivation is associated with dopaminergic
signaling, optimal challenge was associated greater activity within
the caudate, putamen, and NAcc. Consistent with the idea that
intrinsic motivation is associated with suppressed activity in
default mode regions, concentrated focus and goal clarity were
associated with reduced activity within the orbitofrontal cortex
and ACC. Additionally, task-related failure was associated with
increased activity within the cuneus, a structure included within
the default mode network.
In another fMRI study, Ulrich et al. (2014) examined the
neural correlates of flow by asking participants to work onmental
arithmetic task and comparing experimentally challenging levels
with boredom and overload conditions. Results indicated that
flow states were associated with increased activity in the left
putamen and left IFG, again implicating core regions of both
the dopaminergic system and the central executive network.
Results also indicated that flow was associated with deactivations
within the MPFC, suggesting suppressed default mode network
activity. In another study, Yoshida et al. (2014) used functional
near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to examine the time course
of neural activations within the prefrontal cortex during states
of flow and boredom when participants played Tetrisr. Again,
consistent with the idea that intrinsically motivated states recruit
central executive regions, results indicated increasing bilateral
activity within lateral PFC regions during flow. However, a
subsequent fNIRS study by Harmat et al. (2015) that compared
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prefrontal activity across easy, optimally challenging, and
difficult levels of Tetris did not any differences. Despite these
mixed findings, the results of existing studies altogether suggest
that future research would benefit by explicitly testing the
proposition that intrinsic motivation is associated with patterns
of activity across the salience, central executive, and default mode
networks.
DISCUSSION
Recent years have witnessed an emerging interest in the
neurobiological systems that support intrinsic motivational
processes. Although this area of inquiry is young, conceptual
and empirical evidence points to the role of dopaminergic
systems in supporting intrinsically motivated behaviors.
Across different mammalian species, there appear to be
linkages between dopamine and the positive experiences
associated with exploration, new learning and interest in one’s
environment (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Biven, 2012).
Building on Bromberg-Martin et al.’s (2010) distinction between
dopaminergic value- and salience-coding and on previous work
respectively mapping these systems onto the phenomenology
of competence (Tricomi and DePasque, 2016) and interest
(DeYoung, 2013), we propose that intrinsic motivation entails
both types dopaminergic transmission. Because these dopamine
systems entail distinct neural structures, future neuroimaging
studies have a strong conceptual basis for specifying distinct
a priori regions of interest. Beyond that, evidence suggests
that intrinsic motivation involves alterations between the
neural networks of salience detection, attentional control, and
self-referential cognition (Menon and Uddin, 2010; Menon,
2015). Better understanding of these large-scale neural dynamics
may provide greater resolution of the processes that support
high quality learning and performance.
Despite the clear conceptual relationship between intrinsic
motivation and dopaminergic transmission, only two existing
studies provide direct evidence of an association between
these two processes (de Manzano et al., 2013; Gyurkovics
et al., 2016). The bulk of existing research provides indirect
support to the hypothesis that dopamine is a substrate of
intrinsic motivation in that the core regions innervated by
dopamine neurons are activated during intrinsic motivation.
Pharmacological manipulations of dopamine thus represent an
important new research direction. Indeed, such manipulations
have already been fruitfully applied in the study of dispositional
traits (e.g., Wacker and Smillie, 2015) and their application
in the study of motivational states would seem a natural
extension. Pharmacological manipulations of dopamine may, for
example, allow researchers to more precisely decode the neural
mechanisms that mediate the undermining effect of externally
contingent rewards on intrinsic motivation.
The link between dopaminergic systems and intrinsic
motivation may also prove useful for developmental roboticists
for whom the topic of intrinsic motivation has recently fallen
into purview (e.g., Gottlieb et al., 2013, 2016). The stated goal
of developmental robotics is to design embodied agents that
self-organize their development by constructing sensorimotor,
cognitive, and social skills over the course of their interactions
with the environment. Roboticists have proposed that in order
for embodied agents to be capable of intrinsic motivation, they
must not only be outfitted with computational systems that
orient them toward novel, surprising, or uncertain stimuli, but
also with meta-monitoring processes that track their learning
progress in their investigation of such stimuli (Gottlieb et al.,
2013, 2016). Without meta-monitoring processes that track
learning, agents will likely get trapped investigating stimuli that
are random or otherwise unlearnable, precluding the possibility
for self-directed development. The existence of salience- and
value-coding dopaminergic systems, respectively capable of
tracking novelty and rewarding feedback, may partially represent
an organic instantiation of the type of computational system
that Gottlieb et al. (2013, 2016) hypothesize to be a requirement
for intrinsic motivation. We believe that roboticists are
well-positioned to discover the types of computational problems
that need to be solved for a full understanding of the neural
substrates of intrinsic motivation. We thus hope that some of
the present ideas will help to spur robotics research on intrinsic
motivation.
Future studies are also needed to directly test the hypothesis
that intrinsically motivated states entail dynamic switching
between the salience, central executive and default mode
networks. Beyond traditional fMRI analyses comparing activity
in a priori regions across intrinsically and non-intrinsically
motivated states, this hypothesis specifically encourages the
use of connectivity analyses and the adoption of chronometric
techniques that can provide information about the dynamics
and directionality of activity across large-scale networks
(e.g., Sridharan et al., 2008). This research direction may
help to not only elucidate the neural basis of intrinsic
motivation but also to identify the neural mechanisms through
which intrinsic motivation enhances learning and performance
outcomes, especially on tasks that require depth of processing
and high-quality engagement.
Beyond Exploration, Curiosity and
Mastery: Intrinsically Motivated Social Play
SDT uses intrinsic motivation as a broad term for diversity
of activities that are inherently rewarding and growth
promoting (Ryan and Deci, 2017). This is a large class of
behaviors, minimally including curious exploration and
mastery tendencies, on the one hand, and social play, on
the other (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016). To date, human
neuroscience studies have focused on intrinsic motivation
associated with curious exploration and mastery, rather than
social play, and we accordingly based our review on this
subset of intrinsically motivated behaviors. Yet, comparative
affective neuroscience suggests that exploration and social
play have both distinct and overlapping neurobiological and
phenomenological underpinnings, the former being subserved
by the SEEKING system and the latter by the PLAY system
(Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Biven, 2012). The subcortical
PLAY system governs the rough-and-tumble (R&T) interactions
of mammals, energizing them to develop and refine their
physical, emotional, and social competencies in a safe context
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(Panksepp, 1998; Pellis and Pellis, 2007; Trezza et al., 2010;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012). In early mammalian development,
R&T play constitutes a type of embodied social cognition that
provides a basis for cooperation and the adaptive self-regulation
of aggression (Peterson and Flanders, 2005). Humans are of
course also capable of more sophisticated forms of play beyond
R&T such as common playground games, sports play and
friendly humor, but such human play may be nonetheless
organized around basic PLAY motivations (Panksepp, 1998;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012).
We might therefore regard play as intrinsically motivated
socialization (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016), an expression
of people’s complementary tendencies toward autonomy and
sociality in development (Ryan, 1995; Ryan et al., 1997). Indeed,
research in SDT suggests that in addition to competence
and autonomy, people have a basic psychological need for
relatedness, the sense of feeling meaningfully connected with
others (Ryan and Deci, 2017). Whereas strong associations
between exploratory intrinsic motivations and satisfactions of
competence and autonomy have been clearly demonstrated,
relatedness is usually seen to play a more distal role in the
expression of these intrinsic motivations. Specifically, relatedness
satisfactions provide people (especially children) with a sense of
safety, a secure base from which their exploratory tendencies can
be more robustly expressed (Ryan and Deci, 2017). Recognition
of social PLAY signifies the centrality of the need for relatedness
in some intrinsically motivated activities.
Interest in the overlaps and contrasts between intrinsically
motivated exploration and play is thus an important agenda
for future studies and both are relevant to intrinsic motivation
as it is studied within SDT (Ryan and Di Domenico, 2016).
Behavioral models of human intrinsic motivation have generally
conflated exploration and play because these activities share
common features such as an internal perceived locus of causality
and perceived competence or mastery. Indeed, functional
distinctions between intrinsically motivated exploration and
object or manipulative play are subtle and suggest that, for many
activities recognized as ‘‘playful’’, the conflation is appropriate
and productive. For example, Wilson (2000) suggested that ‘‘In
passing from exploration to play, the animal or child changes
its emphasis from ‘What does this object do?’ to ‘What can I do
with this object?’’’ (p.165). In fact, intrinsically motivated object
play, manipulative play, and solitary gaming likely arise from
the activity of the SEEKING system (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp
and Biven, 2012). Clearly, more empirical work is needed to
differentiate these types of intrinsic motivation in humans.
Methodological Suggestions
Our principal intent in this review article, is to stimulate
increasing integration between social behavioral research on
intrinsic motivation and the neuroscience of motivation. We
see many new and promising pathways opening up. At the
same time, methodological issues persist that warrant serious
considerations. We list but a few of these.
First, intrinsic motivation and the associated undermining
effect of rewards on these behaviors pertain only to tasks
that are interesting and enjoyable in the first place. Thus,
researchers should pilot test target activities to ensure that the
activities are suitable for examining the undermining effect. This
is especially important in neuroscience, where contemporary
methods such as fMRI often involve procedures that limit
how interesting experimental tasks can be. Researchers should
also use multi-method assessments of intrinsic motivation to
validate their measures and to ensure that the correct behavioral
phenomena are being tapped. For example, in an attempted (and
failed) replication and extension of Murayama et al.’s (2010)
fMRI study on the undermining effect, Albrecht et al.’s (2014)
utilized a picture-discrimination task for which participants may
not have been intrinsically motivated in the first place (pilot
testing was not reported) and for which free-choice behavior
was not examined as a dependent variable. In the absence of
these important design characteristics, it is difficult to draw
decisive conclusions from their experiment. Incidentally, we note
that Albrecht et al.’s (2014) study did show that competence
feedback increased participants’ self-reported fun and that it was
also associated with increased activations within the midbrain,
striatum, and lateral PFC, findings that are consistent with
the idea that competence is associated with dopamine-related
activity.
Second, replicability is a central concern, as it is throughout
the social and personality neurosciences (Allen and DeYoung,
2016). Most studies to date have been small-sample
investigations, and larger samples are needed if we are to
derive foundational conclusions. A priori hypotheses concerning
regions of interest will also add confidence to the interpretation
of findings. Toward that end, the present review ought to
provide future studies with a useful reference for making clear
predictions about the neural basis of intrinsic motivation.
Conclusion
Intrinsic motivation is a topic of interest within both basic
behavioral science and applied translational studies and
interventions (Ryan and Deci, 2000, 2017). Yet important to
the progress of empirical research on intrinsic motivation
is integrating what is known from phenomenological and
behavioral studies with neuroscience studies. As we suggested
at the outset, neuroscience holds potential for testing existing
models of the situational and social determinants of intrinsic
motivation as well as for providing greater resolution on the
affective and cognitive processes that underpin such activities.
Movement toward consilience is a central concern to SDT and
our hope is that the current synthesis provides some broad stoke
encouragement for that agenda.
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